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disorders. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Higher scores indicate more
difficulties in mentalization. Self-reflection: schizophrenia N bipolar. Emotional
awareness and psychic equivalence: schizophrenia N schizoaffective N bipolar. Affect
regulation: bipolar N schizoaffective N schizophrenia (Tukey's HSD tests, ps b 0.05).Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to our ability to understand mental states
(beliefs and intentions), and to explain behaviors based on these attri-
butions (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Mentalization is often used as
a synonym of ToM, although there are substantial epistemological and
historical differences between these concepts. ToM is based on a
model emphasizing cognitive attribution of mental states and inten-
tional stances guided by the perception of social signals (e.g., facial ex-
pressions) (Dennett, 1987). In contrast, mentalization is a more
complex, socially and affectively embedded phenomenon related to re-
flections on the subjective experience of self and others during interper-
sonal interactions (Fonagy et al., 2002). The potential relationship
between ToM and mentalization, as defined above, is unknown in psy-
chotic disorders. This is a major gap in the literature because measures
of ToM andmentalization are seldom differentiated in studies assessing
treatment outcomes.
To elucidate this issue, we used the Mentalization Questionnaire
(MZQ) for the assessment of subjective experiences, and the Reading
the Mind from the Eyes Test (RMET) to investigate ToM. The MZQ is a
15-item self-report questionnaire consisting of four subscales: (1) self-
reflection (evasion of thinking about mental states and feelings charac-
terized by a fear of being overwhelmed; e.g., “Most of the time it is bet-
ter not to feel anything.”), (2) emotional awareness (perception and
discrimination of inner feelings; e.g., “Often I don't even know what is
happening inside of me.”), (3) psychic equivalence (blurred boundary
between innermental states and outer reality; e.g. “If I expect to be crit-
icized or offended, my fear increases more and more.”), and (4) affect
regulation (modulation of emotions, feelings, and impulses;
e.g., “Often I can't control my feelings.”) (Fekete et al., 2019; Hausberg
et al., 2012).
In the RMET, participants saw 36 photographs of eye-regions ex-
pressing social emotions and mental states (e.g., playful, embarrassed,
and contented). The task was to choose which of four words best de-
scribed the mental state (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
We used a categorical approach based on the DSM-5 diagnoses, as
well as a continuum-approach using the schizo-bipolar score (SBS)
(Keshavan et al., 2011). Higher SBS values reflect a more
schizophrenia-like illness (psychotic and negative symptoms accompa-
nied by functional decline), whereas lower scores indicate bipolar-like
psychosis (predominant affective symptoms without a marked func-
tional decline) (Keshavan et al., 2011).
We enrolled 150 patients (schizophrenia, n = 50; schizoaffective
disorder, n = 56; bipolar disorder, n = 44) who were assessed with
the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), the Hamilton De-
pression Rating Scale (HAM-D), and the Young Mania Rating Scale
(YMRS). All participants gave written informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the
Medical Research Council (ETT-TUKEB) (for the details of assessment,
see supplementary methods online).https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2019.08.023
0920-9964/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Results from the MZQ are shown in Fig. 1. An analysis of variance
(ANOVA) revealed significant main effects of DSM-5 diagnosis (F
(2,147) = 15.35, η2 = 0.17, p b 0.001), MZQ subscales (F(3, 441) =
23.36, η2 = 0.14, p b 0.001), and a two-way interaction between diag-
nosis and subscales (F(6, 441) = 30.41, η2 = 0.29, p b 0.001). There
were two key findings. First, patients with schizophrenia displayed
weaker self-reflection than patientswith bipolar disorder (Tukey's Hon-
estly Significantly Difference tests, p b 0.05). Second, patientswith bipo-
lar disorder showed the most severe difficulties in the regulation of
affect as compared to the other psychotic groups (p b 0.05) (Fig. 1.).
As expected, patients with schizophrenia recognized the fewest
number of mental states on the RMET (M = 21.0, SD = 4.2), followed
by the schizoaffective group (M=23.6, SD=3.0), and bipolar patients
(M = 25.6, SD = 4.3) (F(2,147) = 16.9, p b 0.001) (Bora and Pantelis,
2016).
We also performed stepwise regression analyses to explore the pre-
dictors of the MZQ scores. The SBS was the most frequent significant
predictor (all ps b 0.05). Specifically, higher SBS predicted weaker emo-
tional awareness (b = 0.32) and psychic equivalence (b = 0.45),
whereas the relationship was the opposite in the case of affect regula-
tion (b = −0.49). PANSS negative symptoms predicted dysfunctions
in self-reflection (b = 0.26) and emotional awareness (b = 0.29). Fi-
nally, higher HAM-D scores were specifically related to affect regulation
(b = −0.25).
Next, we repeated the above-described analyses by adding the
RMET scores to the regression models to explore the relationship be-
tween mentalization (MZQ) and ToM (RMET). The RMET scores
emerged as the single predictor of MZQ emotional awareness (b =
472 Letter to the Editor−0.44) and self-reflection (b = −0.41). In contrast, the SBS remained
themain predictor for psychic equivalence (b=0.39) and affect regula-
tion (b=− 0.56) (for the details of the statistical analyses, see supple-
mentary results).
Our results lend support to the assumption that ToM and
mentalization are not a unitary phenomenon in psychotic disorders.
Specifically, poor self-reflection was related to more severe
schizophrenia-like symptoms, whereas weakened affect regulation
was associated with dominant bipolar-like symptoms. Patients with
schizophrenia-like psychoses demonstrated severe difficulties in dis-
criminating their inner states and exhibited a blurred boundary be-
tween their mental representation and the external reality. In this
respect, the categorical approach (DSM-5 diagnoses) and the
continuum-model (SBS scores) provided consistent results.
Regarding the relationship between ToM and mentalization, ToM
strongly predicted emotional awareness and self-reflection, but not psy-
chic equivalence and affect regulation. Therefore, the recognition of
mental states of others via social perception is significantly related to
thinking about one's own mental states (van der Weiden et al., 2015),
but not to reality testing and emotion regulation. These results suggest
that distinct dimensions of ToM and mentalization should be taken
into consideration in clinical investigations focusing on social cognition
and functional remediation in different psychotic disorders (Green
et al., 2019).
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